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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE
GEORGE KEVIN YOST, a minor
by and through his Guardian
ad Litem, Charlene Yost, and
CHARLENE YOST, individually,

OF UTAH

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs/
Respondent,

)
)
)

vs.

)

STATE OF UTAH, STEVE HAMMON,
CARLO SACCO d/b/a SACCO'S
PRODUCE, QUICK STOP, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and
CHRIS L. PETERSEN d/b/a
CHRIS'S,

)
)
)
)
)
)

)

Case No. 16990

)

Defendants/
Appellants.

)
)
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE

The Plaintiff/Respondent, a minor, sought damages
from the defendants for injuries caused by the defendants'
illegal sales of alcohol to Respondent and other minors.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judge John F. Wahlquist.determined that the
defendants were negligent in causing Respondent's injuries,
each in the following degrees:
Hammon

80%

Chris's

10%
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The Lower Court also found Respondent to have been negligent
to the extent of 5%.

Before the trial, a settlement was

reached between Respondent and the defendant HAMMON and the
Complaint was dismissed as against HAMMON.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have this Court

disr~gard

as

unfounded the Appellant's claim of .not being a proper party
defendant.
Respondent also seeks this Court's affirmance of
the Lower Court's finding that all of the defendants were
negiigent.

The Respondent agrees with the appellant in his

assertion that the Lower Court under-assessed the State's
negligence in this case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent will not disagree with the substance of
Appellant's statement of facts, except for the following
qualifications and additions.
Chris's is a family business, Chris L. Petersen
being the father and head of that family.

There was no

evidence adduced at trial which could reasonably be construed as showing Mr. Petersen to be other than a proper
party defendant.
on the date of the accfdent, Chris's and the State
of Utah, as well as the other defendants, illegally sold
alcohol to certain minors, the oldest of whom was then
eighteen (18) years of age.

The District Court concluded

that.two of the three minors looked siqnificantlv vounaer
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- 3 than they really were at the time of the illegal sales, ~nd
that no reasonable and careful person could have mistaken
the ages of any of the boys as being twenty-one (21).

As a

result of the defendants' illegal sales, they became intoxicated.

One of these intoxicated minors drove his vehicle

over the side of a canyon road, over turned the truck and
his passenger, the Respondent, was very seriously and permanently injured.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT, CHRIS L. PETERSEN, IS A
PROPER PARTY DEFENDANT.
The Appellant contends that he, Chris L. Petersen,
is not a proper party·defendant in this action.

However,

the Respondent in his Complaint sued not only Mr. Petersen
as an individual, but also his family business "Chris's."
Mr. Petersen was not a witness in the trial, but
his wife, Carol Petersen, did give some testimony which is
helpful on this issue:
Q:

"In addition to that, do you have any other
avocation, other than your chosen profession?"

A:

"I work at our family business."

Q:

"And is that business known as 'Chris's'?"

A:

"Right."

(T 190)

Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
states that,
"When two or more persons associated in
any business either as a joint stock company,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 4 a partnership or other association, not a
corporation, transact such business under a
common name, whether it comprises the names
of such associates or not, they may be sued
by such common name; and any judgment
obtained against the defendant in such case
shall bind the joint property of all the
associates in the same manner as if all had
been named defendants and all had been sued
upon their joint liability."
This Rule is controlling here to allow suit against Mr.
Petersen and his business.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that Rule 17(d)
does not apply, the Appellant may not now prevail on his
claim of being other than a proper party defendant.

In his

Answer the Appellant raised this claim as an affirmative
defense.

However, at trial there was no testimony suggesting

that Mr. Petersen. is not a proper defendant.
This Court in Booth v. Crompton, 583

P~2d

82 {Utah

1978), at Note 2, stated that the proper construction of
Rule 8(c) places the burden of proving an affirmative defense
on the party asserting it.

In failing to adduce the necessary

evidence at trial, the Appellant failed to meet his burden.
He may not now at this late date attempt to correct this
defect by providing this Court with an Affidavit.
Rule 8{f) states,
"All pleadings shall be so construed as to
do substantial justice.h
The Respondent's purpose was to sue the entity, Chris's,
which had made the illegal sale of alcohol.

As father and

head of that family, Mr. Petersen was properly made a party
defendant.
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- 5 ARGUMENT
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE DEFENDANTS
WERE NEGLIGENT, BUT IT UNDER-ASSESSED THE DEGREE
OF THE STATE'S COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.
The appellant's brief points out to this Court
some of the important fa~ts surrounding the State Liquor
Store's improper and illegal sale of alcohol to the minors.
Respondent agrees that the District Court's finding regarding
the State Liquor Store's comparative negligence is grossly
low when the facts surrounding respondent's injuries are
considered.
The basic purpose of the law prohibiting the sale
of alcohol to minors is to protect those minors from their
own lack of judgment and to protect society as well.

The

Legislature has invoked the State's police powe;s to control
the dispensation of intoxicating liquors and UCA 32-1-2 (1953)
requires that all laws and regulations relating to the sale
and use of alcohol be liberally construed so as to protect
the public health, peace and morals.

As potential sources

of alcohol to minors, the vendors have a strict responsibility to ascertain whether or not purchasers are of legal
age.

If the person seeking to buy alcohol is under the age

of 21, the vendor must refuse to make the sale.
32-7-15(1); 32-1-39.)

(See UCA

Obviously, a prevayor of substances

so potentially destructive as alcohol must have and use very
good judgment with regard to who may receive the alcohol.
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- 6 Sometimes a vendor can ascertain the age of the buyer by
demanding to see the buyer's identification card.

However,

whenever the buyer's age may still be in question, the
vendor must inquire beyond the allegation of age stated on
the identification card and in such cases, the buyer must be
required to sign a statement on a form provided by the
Commissioner of Public Safety.

(See UCA 32-9-9.)

The

State's negligence in this case was quite extreme in that
not even the minimum requirements of law were met--no proof
of age was requested of the minors at all.

In this omission,

the State was clearly remiss since as the District Court
found, the young buyers looked even younger than they actually were.

(Findings of Fact 1-2.)

Of course, other vendors

in this case were negligent and the District Court properly
made that conclusion.
In making its finding that the appellant was more
n~gligent

than was the respondent, the District Court appar-

ently adopted the thinking of the Court in Prevatt v.
Mcclennan, 201 So. 2d 780, 781 (Fla. App. 1967) where that
Court said:
"Here the statute forbidding the sale of liquor
to minors was violated and constitutes negligence
per se. The statute t~at makes it a crime to sell
intoxicants to minors was doubtless passed to
prevent the harm that can come or be caused by
one of immaturity by imbibbing such liquors. The
very atmosphere surrounding the sale should make
it forseeable to any person that trouble for someone was in the making.
"The proximate cause of the injury is the sale
rather
than the consurnpti~~~~-~Emnhasis ann~n
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In light of the fact that the State Liquor Store
sold five (5) "fifths'' of wine without requiring ID to boys
who looked younger than they actually were, it was quite
inconsistent of Judge Wahlquist to find the appellant Chris's
twice as negligent as was the State of Utah.

By the same

token, it was inapproprfate for the District Court to hold
that the defendant State of Utah was not more negligent than
was the young respondent.
The State of Utah and the other defendants were
negligent as a matter of both fact and law.

It was factu-

ally unreasonable for the defendants, including the State,
to have sold such a large quantity of alcohol to boys who
appeared to be well under the legal age.

It was simply

unreasonable to think that such boys could find safe and
proper use for such quantities of alcohol.

Moreover, the

mere fact of having made the sale to the minors was negligence as a matter of law.

The Legislature has recognized a

basic disability of people under the age of 21 in relation
to alcohol.

This disability is an inherent incapacity to

use proper discretion.
Judge Wahlquist's Memorandum Decision shows his
attempt at balancing the various factors from which the
parties' comparative negligence could be derived.

As stated

before, it seems unreasonable that the appellant Chris's
could have been twice as negligence as was the State.
However, it was equally unreasonable that the Lower Court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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did ~ot find all of the defendants more negligent than was
the respondent.
Several jurisdictions have adopted a view which
would have made all of the defendants more negligent as a
matter of law than was the respondent in this case.

For

example, in so·ronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582,
218 A.2d 630,
tributary

(1966), the Court disallowed a claim of con-

n~gligence

where a tavern keeper had negligently

sold alcoholic beverages to a physically intoxicated person.
The Court held that contributory

n~gligence

would not apply

in such a situation and its rationale is equally applicable
to our case.

That Court said at 218 A.2d 636:

"Since the patron has become a danger to himself
and is in no position to exercise self-protective
care, it is right and proper that the law view the
responsibility as that of the tavern keeper alone."
In our case, since the law's purpose is to impose
upon vendors of alcohol the responsibility of protecting
minors from their inherent incapacity to take self-protective
care, the best view is that the vendors of alcohol must
assume full responsibility for injuries caused by the intoxication of their purchasing minors.
Such a policy would very much discourage vendors
from making illegal sales and the result would be a safer
society. The problems of immature drinkers should be stopped
at the main source--the vendors.
In reaching a similar conclusion, one Court has
said the following:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Nor can it be said that such a rule imposes ~n
undue burden upon the tavern keeper, for, as the
Supreme Court observed in Soronen, he 'may readily
protect himself by the exercise of reasonable
care.'" Aliulis v. Tunnel Hill Corp., 114 N.J.
Super. 205, 275 A.2d 751, 753 (1971).
The laws against selling alcohol to minors is in
effect a safety law intended to protect minors and society
from potential destruction.

In Cappa v. Oscar

c.

Holmes, Inc.,

25 Cal.App.3d 978, 102 Cal.Rptr. 207 (1972), the Court dealt
with a violation of safety laws on a construction site.

Two

boys had decided to take a shortcut through a construction
site which lacked the necessary fences and railings.

The

defendant's only precautionary measure.was a sign stating,
"Danger--Constru6tion Parking Only."

Notwithstanding this

sign, the boys walked.through the uncompleted construction
site and one fell several feet, sustaining severe injuries.
The Court said,
"It is clearly the law that the defense of
assumption of risk is inapplicable when the action
is based on a violation of a safety law intended
to protect the class in which a party is a member."
The doctrine of estoppel would also require a
finding that each defendant vendor of alcohol was more
negligent than was the minor purchaser.

This is true because

the vendors are the primary and instigating causes of the
respondent's injuries and had the illegal sales not been
made to the minors, they would not have become intoxicated
\

and consequently injured.
"It is a maximum in the law of estoppel that
where one of two innocent persons must suffer,
he whose act occasioned the loss must bear it."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
175
Library Services,,,
and Assicurazioni.
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- 10 The respondent does not claim that he was completely innocent of wrong doing in this case, but the vendors
were each the more primary violators of the law and they
should each bear the greater responsibility for the resulting
injuries. None of the defendants, including the State of
Utah, is immune from the doctrine of estoppel.

See Shafer

v. State of Washington, 521 P.2d 735 (1974).
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chris L. Petersen, who does business as
"Chris's" is properly a party defendant in this action.
This conclusion is grounded on Rule 17(d), Rule 8(f), and
this Court's construction of Rule 8(c) as set forth in
Booth

v.

Crompton, 583 P.2d 82 (Utah 1978) at Note 2.
All of the defendants were more negligent than was

the Respondent for injuries occurring to Respondent as a
result of the defendants'

ill~gal

sales of alcohol.

This

conclusion is true a fortiori with regard to the State of
Utah who itself caused the violated law to be enacted and
who must now be estopped from claiming any contributory
fault on the part of Respondent.

It was also unreasonable

for the Lower Court to have found the State of Utah only
half as negligent as was the

appe~lant

Chris's.

It is the vendors who control, in large measure,
who ultimately will have access to intoxicants.
vendors fully responsible for negligently

selli~g

Holding the
to minors

will greatly increase the likelihood of compliance with the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
law.
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Library Services and
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society from the minors' lack of judgment with respect to
intoxicants.
Comparative negligence should not be allowed to
defeat Respondent's claim for recovery as against any
defendant who has violated the laws relating to the sale of
alcohol.

8'

Respectfully submitted

d

day of September,

1980.

RIC ARD RICHARDS
Attorney for Plaintiff /Respondent
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of ~e
foregoing Respondent's Brief to the following this

B7

day

of September, 1980:
Pete N. Vlahos, Esq.
Attorney for Appellant
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Joseph c. McCarthy, Esq.
Attorney for State of Utah
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